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ABS  TRAI 
Although  tax  policy  in most  historical  cases  has  been  barely 
distinguishable  from legalized  theft, why  have  tax  and spending 
policies in a few unusually  fortunate  communities,  such  as some 
of the modern democracies,  apparently been,  if not welfare 
maximizing,  at  least  relatively  benevolent?  We address  this 
question within a general positive analysis of tax and spending 
policy  that  focuses  on the  effects  of political  competition  and 
its  interaction  with  other constraints  on policy choices, 
especially the constraint that  equilibrium  policies must  be time 
consistent.  The  framework  for  this analysis is  a theory  of a 
proprietary fiscal  authority  whose  objective is to extract  rents 
for the political  establishment,  the proprietor of sovereign 
power.  The analysis shows  that,  if  the political  system is 
sufficiently  stable,  then  a positive  amount  of political 
competition  can  induce  the proprietary  fiscal  authority  to behave 
more  like a hypothetically  benevolent fiscal  authority.  But, 
political competition  can  lower  the equilibrium tax rate only 
until  the time—consistency  constraint becomes  binding.  Moreover, 
in a reputational  equilibrium,  the minimum time—consistent  tax 
rate  is lower  the more  concern that the policymaker  has  for 
future  political rents.  Accordingly, because  this  concern  for 
the  future  increases  with more political  stability,  the 
beneficial effect  of political  competition  also  increases  with 
the stability  of  the political  system. 
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Providence,  RI  02912  Hanover, NH  03755 Until  two or three  hundred  years  ago,  it was 
characteristic  almost  everywhere——and  to this day,  it 
is characteristic  in the majority of countries  and  in 
countries  containing the majority  of the world's 
population——that  the primary government  activity was 
and  is extraction of surpluses  from  the predominantly 
agricultural  population  and  use of such  surpluses to 
benefit  tiny  groups  of people  in and near the 
government——Mills [1986], page  134. 
Theories of public finance commonly  presume that  the 
objective of  the  fiscal  authority is  to maximize the welfare or a 
representative  citizen.  It is arguable,  however,  that actual  tax 
and  spending  policies usually do not conform to the normative 
prescriptions  of this benevolent view of  the fiscal  authority 
and, moreover, that  such  divergences  are  not entirely 
attributable  to the  idiosyncratic  ignorance  or foolishness  of 
particular  policymakers.  This  observation  suggests that a useful 
positive  theory  would  view the fiscal  authority  either  as self— 
interested  or as the agent of a self—interested  group that has 
political  power,  rather  than  as benevolent,  but also  as subject 
to economic  and political constraints  that differ across  time and 
place.  Such  a model might help us to understand the wide  range 
of actually observed experience  of tax and  spending  policies. 
Although, as Mills  points  out,  tax policy  in most historical 
cases  has been barely  distinguishable  from  legalized  thett,  why 
have  tax and spending policies  in a  few unusually fortunate 
communities,  such  as some  of the modern  democracies,  apparently 
been,  if not welfare maximizing,  at least  relatively  benevolent? 
An appealingly intuitive,  but  too simplistic,  answer  is  that 
political competition  in democracies  provides  a useful  constraint 
on tax  and spending policies.  One complication  is that  democracy 
is neither necessary  nor sufficient  for political competition. 
More  importantly,  a high  level of political  competition  in fact 
does  not seem always  to produce relatively  benevolent tax and 
spending policies. —2— 
The  present  paper  attempts  to develop a general positive 
analysis  of tax and  spending  policy that  can  clarify  the effects 
of political  competition  and  its  complex  interaction  with other 
constraints  on policy choices,  especially  the  constraint  that 
equilibrium  policies must be time  consistent.  The framework  for 
this  analysis is a theory  of a proprietary  fiscal  authority  whose 
objective is  to extract rents  for  the political  establishment, 
the proprietor  of sovereign  power.  [North  (1981) refers  to the 
objective  of maximizing  political  rents  as  "predatory",  but  it is 
not  clear why this  pejorative  term  is more  warranted in 
describing  the proprietor  of sovereign  power  than  in referring  to 
the activities of self—interested  proprietors  of private 
property.) 
Examples of groups  that  could  constitute the political 
establishment  include the professional  politicians,  the 
bureaucrats,  the  royal  court,  the members and/or supporters  of 
the  ruling party,  the military,  or the clients of any  of these 
groups.  This theory  assumes  that,  although the  identity  ot the 
political  establishment is subject  to change,  it  is  at any point 
in time well  defined.  The  theory  also  assumes that  the  fiscal 
authority  is an efficient  maximizer  of the  self  interest  of the 
political  establishment.1  Accordingly,  tax  and spending  policies 
in this  theory  differ  a little  or a lot  from  the policies that 
would  maximize the welfare  of the representative  citizen,  not 
because  the fiscal authority  is  benevolent  or selfish,  wise  or 
foolish,  knowledgeable  or  ignorant,  but  rather,  as with  any  self— 
interested  proprietary  activity,  because  of the  nature  of the 
constraints,  which in this case  are  both economic and political, 
that  the  fiscal  authority faces. 
In attempting  to maximize political  rents —— or,  more 
precisely,  the  sum of  current  and expected future  political  rents 
—— the  proprietary  fistal  authority is  subject to the basic 
economic  constraint that  political  rents  are  limited  by the —3— 
output  of the producers who  are  subject  to taxation by the fiscal 
authority.  Accordingly,  the  fiscal  authority  faces  an endemic 
trade—off  between increases  in the share  of output  that  goes  to 
political rents  and  the disincentive  effect of increases  in the 
rental  share  on the  tax  base.  The  tiscal  authority  must  take 
account  of  the disincentive  effects  both of high  expected tax 
rates  and  of niggardly  provision of productive  public services. 
If the maximization  of political  rents were subject only  to 
this economic incentive  constraint,  the  fiscal  authority  would 
set  the  tax  rate  at the peak  of the  Latter  curve  and would devote 
only  a fraction of its  revenues  to providing  productive public 
services.  However,  the additional  constraints  associated  with 
political  competition  and with the requirement  of time 
consistency,  both  of which derive  from the  nature  of the 
political  and  legal  system,  can  cause  the equilibrium  tax rate 
and  expenditure  pattern to diverge  from this  simple  revenue  and 
political rent maximizing policy. 
The  competitive  threat  posed  by actual  or potential rivals 
to the existing political  establishment  can operate through 
established legal  processes  that  are peaceful and democratic  or 
it  can  involve  the extralegal  use  of force.  In either case,  to 
pose  an effective  competitive  threat,  rivals must be genuine 
outsiders,  rather than merely parties  or cliques,  that  as in 
Alesina (1988), alternate in power according  to a stationary 
stochastic  process and  that  cooperate,  at least  implicitly,  in 
extracting  and sharing political rents.  It  it exists,  political 
competition  faces  the fiscal authority  with a choice between,  on 
the  one  hand,  tax  and spending policies  that  increase  political 
rents  but decrease both  the  expected  welfare ot the 
representative  citizen and  the  survival  probability  of the 
existing  political establishment  and, on the Other hand,  tax and 
spending policies thatsacrifice  political  rents  in order  to 
increase the survival probability  of the existing political —4— 
establishment  and  its  likelihood  of being  able  to receive 
political rents  in the  future.2  A central  result  ot the analysis 
is that,  if the political  system is sufficiently  stable  (in a way 
defined more  precisely  below),  then  a positive amount  of 
political  competition  induces  an equilibrium in which the 
proprietary  fiscal  authority  sets  a lower  tax  rate  than at the 
peak  of the Laffer curve  and,  despite  reduced  revenues,  spends 
more on productive public  services. 
The requirement  of time  consistency,  if it is a binding 
constraint,  influences  the equilibrium  policy in the opposite 
direction.  The time—consistency  constraint  reflects the 
inability  of  the fiscal  authority  to use  irrevocable  commitments 
to control  its  own future  actions,  including  its future  choice ot 
the  tax  rate.  This  inability  to make commitments  is  a corollary 
of the sovereign's ability  to act without being answerable  to  a 
higher legal  authority,  the power from which the  fiscal 
authority's  power to tax  and  to set  the  tax  rate derives. 
Without irrevocable  commitments,  an expectation  about future 
policy can  be rational,  and  an announcement  about future  policy 
can be credible,  only  if  this  expectation  or announcement is  time 
consistent  ——  that  is,  only  if the  fiscal  authority  will not be 
able  to do better in the  future  than  to validate this expectation 
or announcement.  In general,  a time—consistency  constraint  is 
potentially binding  anytime  that  a sovereign  policymaker  might be 
tempted  to take  actions that other agents  do not  expect.  In the 
present context, the  time—consistency  requirement  restricts the 
equilibrium  tax  rate  to be sufficiently  high  that  the  fiscal 
authority  will resist  the  temptation  to set  the  actual  tax  rate 
higher than  this  expected rate.  The time—consistency  requirement 
thus  limits  the potential  effect  of political competition  on the 
equilibrium  tax  rate.  Political  competition  can lower the 
equilibrium  tax  rate  or'.ly until  the time—consistency  constraint 
becomes  binding. —5— 
Recent theories  —— see,  for example,  Grossman  & Van Huyck 
(1986,  1988) and Grossman (1988)  —— have  emphasized  the role  of 
reputational  considerations  in supporting  time—consistent 
equilibria.  In a reputational  model,  the  implication  of  the 
time—consistency  restriction  for equilibrium  policy depends  in 
large  part on the rate  at which the policymaker  discounts the 
future.  For  example,  in the present context,  if the fiscal 
authority is sufficiently  concerned  about  future  political  rents, 
then  reputation  substitutes  fully  for the inability  to make 
irrevocable  commitments  and  the  time—consistency  constraint  does 
not  bind.  Alternatively,  the  less concern that  the  fiscal 
authority  has  for  future  political  rents  the more  that a binding 
time—consistency  constraint raises  the equilibrium  tax  rate  and 
reduces  spending  on productive  public services. 
An essential  aspect of the analysis of reputation  and  time 
consistency  that  follows  is  that  it associates the fiscal 
authority's discount rate with the survival probability  of the 
existing  political  establishment.  If,  for example,  the existing 
political establishment  has  a high survival probability,  then  the 
fiscal  authority is  greatly  concerned  about  the effects  ot its 
current policies on its potential for extracting  political  rents 
in the future.  In equilibrium,  the  survival  probability  depends 
in turn  on the stability  of the political  system.  Accordingly, 
another central result  of  the analysis  is  that  the beneficial 
effect  of political  competition  increases  with more high 
political stability. 
1.  A Pure  Kleptocrat 
Consider a simple production  economy in which  between  any 
dates  t  and  t+1  producers  divide their  time  between  a non- 
negative fraction  devoted to the production  of  a marketable 
good and  a non—negativ  fraction  lL devoted to production of 
a nonmarketable  good.  For simplicity,  assume  for  now  that  the —6— 
time of producers is  the only  productive input.  [Section  5 below 
extends the  analysis  to consider  a productive  public service.] 
Output  of the marketable  good  is a concave  tunction 
and  arrives  in quantity  at  date  t+1.  Output  of 
the nonmarketable  good is a linear  function of  l—L  and arrives 
in quantity  z1 at date  t+l.  Specifically,  the assumed 
technologies,  summarized  by a single  parameter  a,  are 
(1)  = t,  0  < a < 1,  and 
= 
The  analysis  also assumes  that  neither form of output  is 
storable. 
The  fiscal  authority imposes at date  t+l  a tax on the 
marketable output  at rate  x1, U  x÷i  1.  The utility that 
the representative  producer receives  at date  t+l,  denoted by 
ut+11  is a linear  function of its nonmarketable  output  and  of 
its marketable  output net of taxes  —— specifically, 
u1 
= z1 
÷  (l_x1)y÷1. 
At date  t,  the representative  producer forms  an expectation, 
denoted by  of the  tax  rate that  the tiscal  authority  will 
impose at date  t+l.  Using this  expectation,  the representative 
producer calculates  that  its expected utility  for date  t+l, 
denoted by  u1,  is 
(2)  u1 
= z1 
+  (l—x+1)yt+1. 
Because  the analysis abstracts  from  storage,  the 
representative  producer.  problem is simply  to choose  to 
maximize  u+1.  Given  x÷ and  the production  possibilities 
specified by equations (1),  the solution to this problem is —7— 
0  = (l—x1)° 
<  1. 
According to equation (3), a high  expected tax  rate on marketable 
output  causes  producers to devote  more  time  to nonmarketable,  and 
hence  nontaxable,  production.  Specifically,  t.  is  inversely 
related  to  x1 and  is positive if  and  only  if  x1 is less 
than unity.3  Substituting  equations (1)  and  (3)  into  equation 
(2)  reveals  that given  x÷1  the maximized value  of expected 
utility is 
1 
e  e  1—a  u1 
= a  +  (l—a)Z  a + (l_a)(l_xt÷i) 
A benevolent fiscal  authority  would  set  the tax  rate,  taking 
account of the representative  producer's  behavior,  to maximize 
the representative  producer's  utility.  In the present example, 
which abstracts from productive  public  services,  a benevolent 
fiscal authority  would set  the  tax rate  equal  to zero. 
The proprietary  fiscal  authority's  objective is  to maximize 
the  sum of  the current and  expected  future  rents  that  it 
transfers  to the political  establishment.  4oreover,  in this 
simple  economy, in any period  t+l  political rents,  denoted  by 
are equivalent to current tax  revenues,  given  by 
Thus,  the  proprietary  fiscal  authority acts  like a 
pure kleptocrat.  It uses  the  sovereign  power to tax only  to 
exploit  the producers. 
Because  is  a fixed  function  of  and  is  a 
fixed  function of  the  fiscal  authority  knows  exactly 
how x1y÷1  depends on  x+l 
and  The relevant future, —8— 
however,  extends to an horizon,  denoted  by date  t+h,  h  0, 
that  is a random variable corresponding  to the prospective 
longevity  of the survival in power of the existing political 
establishment.  Thus,  at any  date  t,  the  sum  of current  and 
expected future  political rents,  denoted by  Rt,  is given by 
t+h 
(5)  Rt 
= r 
+ Et 
r  S r 
+ EtRt+l, 
where  r 
= xy  and where  Et  is an operator that  denotes  an 
expectation  taken  over possible realizations  of  h  conditional 
on information  available  at date  t.  [Equation  (5)  assumes 
without loss of generality that  the fiscal  authority  does  not 
discount revenues  received  either before  or at date  t+hj 
To evaluate the expectation  in equation (5), assume that  the 
probability  that  the existing political  establishment,  being  in 
power at date  t,  will not  survive  to date  t+l  is 
where  0 < t+l 
1.  Given this  stochastic  process, and given 
that  h  is the  only  stochastic  element in the model,  the 
expectation  in equation (5)  equals  a discounted  sum of  revenues 
over  an infinite  horizon —— namely, 
(6)  EtRt+1 
= P+ir+i 
+ P+1P+r+2 + 
According to equation (6),  the contribution  ot revenues at any 
future  date  to  Rt  is larger the  larger  is the probability  that 
the  sovereignty  will  survive to that  date. 
To model the competitive  political  threat discussed  above, 
assume that  the  survival  probability  of  the existing 
political establishment  from  date  t  to date  t+l,  depends at 
least  in part  on its popularity  relative to potential  rivals. 
The citizens know,  of zourse,  that  under  any political 
establishment  the fiscal authority  would attempt to maximize —9— 
political  rents.  Accordingly,  the popularity  of the existing 
political  establishment  at date  t  reflects the difference 
between  expected utility at date  t+l  associated  with 
the  existing  political establishment,  and  the equilibrium  value 
of expected utility implied  by proprietary  public finance,  which 
we denote  by  u.  Specifically,  the analysis assumes that 
t+l 
= e[l_q(u*_u1)] 
,  0  0  < 1,  q >  0. 
From  equation (4),  u1 depends negatively  on  x+11 
the 
expectation  that  the representative  producer forms at date  t  of 
the  tax  rate  that  the  fiscal  authority  will  impose  at date  t+l, 
and  u depends in the  same way  on the equilibrium  tax  rate, 
which  we denote by  x.  (We derive  x*  below.) 
In equation (7), the parameter  0  indexes  the stability  of 
the political  system and  the parameter  q  indexes  the 
competitiveness  of the  political  system.  Specifically,  if  0  is 
large and  q  is small,  the political  system is stable  and  not 
highly  competitive.  In this  case,  the survival probability  of 
the existing political  establishment  is high  and  depends  little 
on  the currently  expected tax rate.  In contrast, if  0  and  q 
are both  large,  the political system  is both  stable and highly 
competitive.  In this  case,  the survival  probability  is high if 
and  only  if  the currently  expected  tax  rate  is low relative to 
the equilibrium expected tax  rate. 
At  the other extreme,  if  0  is low, the political  system is 
unstable.  In this  case,  the  survival  probability  is low whatever 
the  value  of  q  or the currently  expected tax  rate.  Such  a 
situation  could  reflect  either  a highly  chaotic internal 
political  process or a high  level  of external threat that  is 
independent  of the popuiarity of the political establishment. —  10  — 
The  present  analysis  treats  both  q  and  B  as exogenous 
structural  parameters.4 
2.  An  Irrevocable  Tax—Rate  Commitment 
Suppose,  hypothetically,  that  at any date  t  the  fiscal 
authority  could irrevocably  commit  itself  to set  a specific 
preannounced  tax  rate at date  t+l.  Moreover,  assume,  for 
simplicity,  that  this preannounced  tax  rate  is operative  whether 
or not  the existing political  establishment  survives to date 
t+1.  (If the  existing  political  establishment  does  not  survive 
to date  t+l,  then  its  replacement  receives the  tax revenue 
associated  with the  preannounced  tax  rate.  )  Denoting  the 
preannounced  tax  rate  as  x+1i 
this  tax—rate commitment  would 
imply 
(9)  x+1 
= 
and  also would imply  that  the representative  producer's 
expectation  of the  tax  rate would  be 
e 
(9)  x+1 
= 
With  an irrevocable  tax—rate  commitment,  current  political 
rents,  are  predetermined.  Hence,  to maximize  Rt,  the 
fiscal authority  at date  t  would  choose  x+1 as  of a 
program  (Tx+l}f, to maximize  expected future political 
rents,  EtRt+1  as given by equation  (6), subject to the 
constraints  given by the production  possibilities,  equations (1), 
the behavior of the  representative  producer, equations (3)  and 
(9), the political process,  equation  (7), and  the tax—rate 
commitment,  equation (8).  Moreover,  if the existing political 
establishment  survives,\the  fiscal  authority  would  face  the same —  11  — 
problem  in choosing  ÷ix÷'  ÷2't+3 
etc.  Thus,  the fiscal 
authority's  problem is  equivalent to the problem of choosing a 
constant  announced  and actual tax  rate,  denoted  x',  to maximize 
(10)  ER = 
---—  r, 
where  r = xy,  y  =  = (l—x), 
p  =  e[l_q(u*_ue)]  ,  and 
=  a  + (l—a)L  = a  + (la)(lx)1. 
In solving  this problem,  the  fiscal  authority  takes  u  as 
given. 
The first—order condition  for a maximum value  of  ER  is 
that  x'  is a value  of  x  such  that 
11)  r  p  r  —0 
(1—p)2 
— 
where  = y  (1 — —s-—  and  =  — 
1—a  1—x  x  l—x 
The  second—order condition  for  a unique  maximum is unambiguously 
satisfied.  Moreover,  at both  x  equals  zero  and  x  equals 
unity,  ER  equals  zero.  Thus,  x'  is  in the  range  U  K x K 1. 
For  0  < x  K x'  ER  is an increasing  function of  x,  and for 
x'  K  x  <  1  ER  is  a  decreasing function  of  x. 
The  first—order  condition  given  by equation (11)  says  that 
the optimal  kleptocratic  tax rate equates  the expected marginal 
revenue from  taxation to the marginal Cost  of the  tax  rate  in —  12  — 
reducing  the probability  of surviving  to collect future  political 
rents.  In the simplest case,  it  q  equals zero,  and, 
accordingly,  ap/x  equals  zero —— that  is,  if there  is no 
political competition  and,  accordingly,  the survival probability 
does  not depend on the expected tax  rate —— then  x  equals 
1—c,  which is  the  tax rate  that  maximizes  tax  revenue,  in the 
absence of political  competition,  a proprietary  fiscal  authority, 
if it could commit itself  to a preannounced  tax  rate,  would set 
the  tax  rate  at the peak  of the  Latter  curve. 
Alternatively,  if  q  is positive,  then  p/x  is 
negative.  Consequently,  equation  (11)  implies  that  3r/3x  is 
positive  arid,  accordingly,  that  x'  is less  than  1—c.  In other 
words,  if the political  system is  competitive,  then the optimal 
kleptocratic  tax  rate  is  less  than the  revenue  maximizing tax 
rate. 
In equilibrium,  ue  equals  u*  and,  consequently,  p 
equals  0.  Imposing this  equilibrium  condition  on equation (11) 
reveals  that,  if the equilibrium  tax  rate  x  were  equal  to 
x',  then  x'  and  x  would  satisfy 
(12)  iL  = 
1—c  l—x' 
Because the rhs  of equation (12) is an increasing  tunction  of x', 
equation (12) implies  that,  if  q  is positive,  then  the larger 
are  q  and  0,  the lower is  x'.  In other words,  the 
equilibrium kleptocratic  tax  rate would  be lower  and,  hence, 
closer to the optimal policy  of a hypothetical  benevolent fiscal 
authority, the more competitive  and  the more  stable  is the 
political  system —— that  is,  the more  that a high  survival 
probability  depends on a low expected tax  rate,  as opposed to 
being  high  or low  independently  of the  tax  rate.  In fact,  as  q 
became  arbitrarily  large,  if  x'  were  the  equilibrium  tax  rate, 
then  x'  and  x would approach zero. —  13  — 
3.  Reputation and Time Consistency 
Because it has sovereign  power,  the  fiscal  authority in tact 
cannot irrevocably  commit itself  to a preannounced  tax rate. 
Moreover, at date  t+].,  because marketable  output  is 
predetermined,  being the result of the producers'  crioice  at date 
t  of  the  fiscal  authority  would  maximize its current 
revenue  x1y1 by setting the  tax  rate  x1 equal  to 
unity.  If,  however,  producers  at date  t  had expected that  the 
tax  rate  at date  t4-l  would be unity——that  is,  that  the fiscal 
authority  would confiscate  all marketable  output——then  they  would 
have  set  the fraction  of their time devoted to the production  of 
marketable  output  equal  to zero.  Accordingly,  for marketable 
output  to be positive  and,  hence,  for potential  political rents  to 
be positive,  producers  at date  t  must  expect  that  the fiscal 
authority  will  resist  the temptation  to set 
xt+i 
opportunistically  equal to unity.5 
This  restriction  implies  that  the preannounced  tax rate, 
must be less  than unity  and credible.  With  credibility, 
x+1. 
the  tax  rate  that producers  expect,  equals  txt+1, 
even 
though  this preannounced  tax  rate  is not an irrevocable 
commitment.  Credibility  in turn  requires  time  consistency  —— that 
is,  the  sum of current and  expected  future political rents  must  be 
at least  as large  if  the  fiscal  authority  honors  this  pre— 
announcement  as it would  be if the fiscal  authority  were to set 
the  tax  rate  equal  to unity. 
To analyze the determination  of  the set  of credible 
preannounced  tax  rates,  we use  a simplified  version of models of 
expectations  developed in previous analyses  of reputational 
equilibria for monetary and  fiscal  policy —— see,  for example, 
Grossman (1988) and Grossman  & Van  Huyck  (1986,  1988). 
Specifically,  assume that  fiscal  aufhoritles  always preannounce 
credible tax  rates  ardfollow  a rational  policy  of honoring their —  14  — 
preannouncements,  except for  an infinitesimal  fraction,  ,  of 
instances  in which they  inexplicably  lose  the  rational  ability to 
resist  the temptation  to set the  tax  rate  equal  to unity.  A loss 
of rational restraint  could  result  either from  idiosyncratic 
irrationality  or from  a breakdown in the process by which the 
individuals  who compose the  fiscal  authority  reach  their 
decisions.  Either infirmity,  however  uncommonly it occurs,  is 
intrinsic  and  irreversible. 
Knowing  this pattern of fiscal  authority  behavior,  producers, 
when  dealing with  a specific  fiscal  authority, attach 
probability  l—,  which equals  approximately  unity,  to rational 
behavior as long  as this  fiscal  authority  has always honored its 
preannounced  tax  rate  in the past.  If,  alternatively,  this  fiscal 
authority  has  ever  set  the  tax rate  equal  to unity,  producers 
would expect  such  confiscatory  behavior in the  future.  In this 
case,  which occurs with frequency  E,  or  approximately  zero, 
future marketable output,  and  hence  potential  political  rents, 
would be zero.  [We can easily extend  this  analysis  to allow 
producers  to ignore  an isolated instance  of confiscatory  taxation 
or to forget  distant  past  behavior.  In Grossman  & Van  Huyck 
(1988),  memory is a stochastic  process.] 
Given that  the fiscal  authority  at date  t  has  a reputation 
for honoring its preannounced  tax rate,  these assumptions about 
producers' expectations  imply  that 
(13)  for  .  =  t, +l 
= txt+l  and 
for  t  >  r,  either  x+1 
= 
if  x  x  for  all  j  >  U,  t—J  t—J—1  t—J 
or  x1 
=  1  otherwise. —  15  — 
With  expectations  evolving according  to condition (13), the time— 
consistency property given the stationary structure  of the  model, 
implies  that,  if  is less  than unity and  is credible, then 
satisfies  the  time—invariant  condition 
(14)  xy 
)  y. 
The  lhs of condition (14) gives  the present value  at any  date 
t+1  of current and expected future  political  rents  if  at all 
dates  r  >  t  the  fiscal  authority  announces  tax  rate  x  for  date 
r+1  and  then  honors  this announcement  at date  r+1.  This 
strategy would  yield political rent equal to  xy  at all dates 
t+1  and survival probability  p  from  all dates  T+l  to 
T+2,  where  t+h+l  T+1  t1-l.  The  rhs  of condition (14) gives 
the present value  at any  date  t+l  of political rents  if the 
fiscal  authority  has announced  tax  rate  x  at date  t  and were 
to set  the  tax  rate  equal  to unity at date  t+l.  This strategy 
would yield political  rents  equal  to  y  at date  t+1,  but would 
mean that  at all  future  dates  marketable output  and political 
rents  would be zero.  Condition (14) simply  says  that for  a tax 
rate  less  than  unity  to be time  consistent the value  of the 
strategy of honoring this preannounced  tax  rate  must  be at least 
as large  as  the value  of the  confiscatory  strategy. 
To determine how condition (14) restricts  the equilibrium tax 
rate  x*,  recall  that  in equilibrium,  because  0e  equals  u, 
p  equals  0.  Consequently,  after  imposing  the equilibrium 
condition that  x  equals  x,  condition (14)  implies  that  x 
must  satisfy 
(15)  x* )  j.. 
Condition (15)  says  that  the time—consistency  requirement 
implies  a minimum value  for  the equilibrium  tax  rate  and  that  this 
minimum tax  rate  is lower  the more  stable is  the political system. —  16  — 
More  stability,  i.e., larger  0,  implies a lower  value  tar the 
minimum equilibrium  tax  rate  because  larger  0  implies  a higher 
survival probability  p  for  the political  establishment  and  thus 
a higher value tar expected future  political  rents  relative to 
current political  rents. 
4.  Reputational  Equilibrium 
Given that producers base  their  expectation  about the  fiscal 
authority's  tax policy on the  fiscal  authority's  current and past 
record of honoring  preannounced  tax  rates,  a rational  fiscal 
authority  considers  how  its  current  tax  rate affects its 
reputation for honoring its preannouncements  and  how  its 
reputation  affects its ability to extract  political rents  in the 
future.  Specifically,  taking  account  of its reputation  for 
rational behavior,  the proprietary  fiscal  authority's  problem at 
date  t  is to choose the constant announced  and  actual  tax  rate 
x to solve  the problem of maximizing current  and expected tuture 
political rents —— the problem given by equation (lu) above  —— 
subject  to the additional  time—consistency  constraint given  by 
condition (15).  This  setup  implies  that  x*  is the  tax  rate  that 
would provide the  largest  value  of  ER  subject  to the condition 
that  the  expectation  that  the  fiscal authority  will  honor its 
preannounced tax rate  is time  consistent.  The assumption that  the 
equilibrium corresponds  to the best  time—consistent  expectation is 
consistent with  the  fiscal  authority's  ability  to make an active 
decision to announce the  tax  rate  x. 
The analysis in Section 2 derived  the tax  rate  x'  that 
would produce the highest value  of  ER  given that  the fiscal 
authority  honors this preannounced tax  rate.  If  x'  is equal to 
or larger than  1—9,  then  the preceding  analysis  implies that 
condition (15) is note binding  constraint  on the choice of  x*. 
In that  case,  reputatic' is a perfect substitute for irrevocable 
commitments  and,  accordingly,  x  equals  x'. —  17  — 
Alternatively, if  x'  is smaller  than  1—0,  then  condition 
(15)  is a binding constraint  on the choice  of  x.  In that  case, 
because, for  x  such  that  x'  < x  1,  ER  is  a decreasing 
function of  x,  condition (15) is satisfied  as an equality —— 
that  is,  x equals  1—0.  Nevertheless,  as long  as  0  is 
positive, reputation  is an imperfect  substitute  for  irrevocable 
commitments,  and  time consistency  does  not  imply  contiscatory 
taxation.  In sum,  the time—consistent  reputational  equilibrium 
sat: is  f  i  e  s 
(16)  x*=max(xI,l_0). 
Equation (16),  together  with  equation (12), has  the following 
implications.  First,  if and  only  if  both  0  >  a  and  q  > 0, 
then  x  <  1—a.  Second,  if and  only  if either  0 = a  or  q = 0, 
then  x  =  1—a.  Third,  if  and  only  if  0  < a,  then  x  > l. 
Figure  1 illustrates  these  implications  of equations (12)  and 
(16).  In this figure,  the  boundary  labelled  x  1—0  divides 
(q,0)  space  into  the region above  x  1—0  in which the time— 
consistency  constraint  given by condition (15) is not binding and 
in which  x  = x'  > 1—0  and  the  region  below  x'  = 1—0  in which 
the time—consistency  constraint is binding  and  in which 
x  = 1—8  >  x'.  From equation (12), the  x = 1—0  boundary 
satisfies  the equality 
(17)  q = (1  — ---- .j!) 
Equation  (17) implies  that  this  boundary  is positively sloped, 
intersects  the  q =  0  axis  at  0  = a,  and approaches  q = 1 
as  8  approaches  unity. 
In the region above  x =  1—0,  iso—tax—rate  loci  depict 
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the  same  value  of  x,  where  x  = x'.  The  iso—tax—rate  locus 
for  x*  x =  1—a,  the revenue maximizing tax  rate,  coincides 
with the  segment  a  0  <  1  of  the  q =  U  boundary.  All  of  trie 
other iso—tax—rate loci  above  x'  = 1—0  lie  inside  the  q = U 
boundary, are negatively sloped,  and  have  x  = x'  <  1—a.  In this 
subregion, political competition, i.e.,  q  >  0,  makes  the  optimal' 
kieptocratic tax  rate  lower  than  the revenue—maximizing tax  rate. 
In the  region  below the  x'  1—0  boundary, iso—tax—rate 
loci  depict combinations of  0  and  q  that  imply  the same value 
of  x,  where  x  1—0.  All of these  iso—tax—rate  loci  are 
horizontal.  Starting at the  x'  = 1—0  boundary and moving 
through the region below  x  = 1—0  towards smaller values or  0 
we  are initially in the subregion between  the boundary  x'  =  1—0 
and  the iso—tax—rate locus  for  x  = 1—0  1—a.  In this 
subregion,  the iso—tax—rate loci  have  x  =  1—0  K 1—a  —— that  is, 
although the time—consistency constraint is binding, the 
equilibrium  tax  rate  is less  than  the revenue—maximizing  tax 
rate.  Eventually,  as we continue moving towards smaller values 
of  8,  we cross  the  iso—tax—rate locus  for  x =  1—0  = 1—a.  Now 
we are  in the subregion in which the iso—tax—rate loci have 
x  1—8  >  1—a  —— that  is,  the time—consistency  constraint forces 
the  equilibrium  tax  rate  above  the revenue—maximizing  tax  rate. 
Here  we continue to cross  higher iso—tax—rate  loci  until finally 
we reach the iso—tax—rate locus  for  x  = 1—8  =  1,  which 
coincides  with the  0  =  0  boundary. 
The  subregion  of  x  = 1—0  > 1—a  accords with the  idea  of 
Buchanan & Lee  (1982)  that  "a short  political time  horizon" could 
result  in an equilibrium tax  rate  that  is on  the  wrong  side of the 
Laffer curve.  The present analysis formalizes the concept of a 
short political time  horizon in terms  of a model in which an 
unstable political structure implies  a low equilibrium survival 
probability for  the political establishment.  In the subregion of 
= 1—0  >  1—a,  political rent  would  be  larger  if  the fiscal —  19  — 
authority  were able  to create the expectation  of a lower tax rate 
and were  to validate this  expectation.  The announcement of a 
lower  tax  rate,  however, would  not  be credible because a lower tax 
rate would not  be time  consistent.  In this  model,  the fiscal 
authority can  be on the wrong side  of  the Laffer curve  not because 
it is stupid,  but because it  is  in a time—consistency  trap.  In 
the most extreme possibility, in which the index of political 
stability  0  is zero,  producers would expect confiscatory 
taxation and  the proprietary fiscal  authority would extract zero 
political rents. 
Most importantly,  Figure  1 illustrates that  the equilibrium 
kleptocratic tax  rate  x is lowest,  and,  hence,  closest to the 
zero tax  rate  of a benevolent fiscal  authority, if both  the index 
of political stability,  0,  and  the  index  of political 
competition,  q,  are  large.  But,  Figure  1 also illustrates that 
a larger  q  implies  a lower equilibrium  tax  rate  if and only 
if  0  is large  enough  and  q  is small  enough that  the  time— 
consistency constraint is not binding.  Thus,  the  effect  of  q 
on  x*  is limited.  Moreover,  the smaller is  0,  the smaller is 
the  range  of values of  q  over  which a  larger  q  implies a 
lower  x*.  If  9  is small enough  or if  q  is large  enough that 
the  time  consistency constraint is binding,  then  x depends on 
9  but  not  on  q. 
5.  Functional Kleptocracy 
To generalize the preceding analysis, assume now  that  the 
production of  the marketable good requires combining the time of 
producers with a productive public service.  At date  t,  the fiscal 
authority provides this  public service in amount  g, 
U. 
Specifically, in place of equations (1), the assumed technologies, 
now summarized by the parameters  a and 8,  are 20  — 
(18)  =  a > 0,  > U,  a +  K 1  and 
z1 
= 
According  to equations (18), producers  time  and public services 
have  positive and diminishing marginal products and are 
complementary inputs  both of which are essential tor production of 
the marketable good.  Also,  returns  to scale are diminishing. 
Allowing for  a productive  public service provides a useful 
social  function for the proprietor of sovereign power and  an 
associated rationale for  why  the producers willingly subject 
themselves to the  sovereign power  to tax.  With  the amount of 
marketable output, which provides the tax  base,  depending on the 
provision of an essential productive  public service,  the 
proprietary fiscal  authority's objective of maximizing political 
rents  requires it to use  some  of its  tax revenues to provide this 
productive public service.  Accordingly, the  use  ot  the sovereign 
power to tax  is not purely exploitive.  In  this  extended  model, we 
can characterize the proprietary fiscal  authority as a tunctional 
kleptocrat.  [For simplicity,  the analysis treats  productive 
expenditures and political rents  as distinct, although in practice 
particular budgeted expenditures  can  have  both  productive 
components and  rent  components,  which outsiders probably are 
unable  to distinguish.] 
The  representative  producer's problem still is to choose 
to maximize  as  given  by equation (2).  Given  x+1, 
and  the production possibilities specified by equations (18), 
the solution to this  problem, in place  of equation (3), now  is 
1 
e  1—a 
(19)  0  =  [(l—x+1)g] 
1. —  21  — 
According to equation (19),  Z 
is positive if and  only  if the 
expected tax rate is less  than unityand the amount of public 
services is positive.  Moreover,  is larger the lower is 
and  the  larger is t•  {We  ignore  the possibility that 
x1 would be sufficiently small  and  gt sufficiently large to 
make equation (19)  inconsistent  with the condition  <  1.  In 
that  event,  would equal unity.)  Substituting equations (18) 
and  (19)  into  equation (2)  reveals  that  the maximizeu value  of 
expected utility is still  given by equation (4). 
To finance the provision of  gt'  the  fiscal  authority issues 
tax—anticipation  notes  that  mature  at date t+l,  when it redeems 
these  notes  with the  tax  revenue  from the marketable output that 
has enhanced.  For  simplicity,  assume that  these notes  are 
fully  collateralized and  that  the interest rate is  zero.  Thus, 
the  fiscal  authority must choose  Xt+l  to satisfy the budget 
constraint  x1  g.  See Grossman & Van Huyck (1988)  for 
a complementary reputational model  of sovereign debt  that 
emphasizes the possibility  of debt  repudiation.] 
A benevolent tiscal  authority in this  extended model  would 
face  the standard problem in normative  public finance of choosing 
a socially optimal amount of public  expenditure that has  to be 
financed by distortionary taxation.  Given the preferences and 
behavior of  the representative  producer, this  problem reduces  to 
the problem of choosing, subject to the fiscal authority's budget 
constraint  and  to  x÷1 
= x÷1i  and x1 to maximize '  as 
given  by equation (19), thereby maximizing  as given by 
equation (4).  The  time—invariant  solution for  this problem, 
denoted by  g and  x,  equates the marginal product of public 
services to unity, thereby  maximizing the  net contribution or 
public services to marketable output,  and satisfies the fiscal 
authority's budget constraint as an equality.  Specitically, 
p and  x  satisfy —  22  — 
(20)  ag1  = 1  or, equivalently,  g  = 8y,  and 
(21)  xy  = g. 
Equations (20) and  (21) together imply  that  x  equals  8. 
Equations (19) and (20) together also imply  that  the optimal 
values  of g and  x are  inversely  related.  Specifically, 
1 
(22)  g  = 
This  inverse  relation obtains because a lower  value  of x implies a 
larger value  of  L  and,  hence, a higher marginal product of 
public services. 
Returning to the proprietary fiscal  authority, consider first 
the policy of the  functional kleptocrat in the case in which the 
time—consistency  constraint is not binding.  In this  case,  the 
equilibrium amount  of public services,  denoted by g',  and  the 
equilibrium announced and actual tax  rate,  again  denoted by x', 
solve the problem of maximizing 
(23)  ER =  r, 
8  8  where r = xy  — g,  y  = 2.  g  =  [(l—x)g  I  g 
*  e 
p  =  8  [l—q(u —u  )I ,  and 
1 
=  +  (l—a)L  =  +  (l—a)[(1—x)g8]1 
The differences between the problem given by equation (23) for  the 
functional kleptocrat and  the problem given by equation (10)  above 
for  the pure kleptocrat are that in equation (23) both the current 
amount of political rens 
and  the expected utility of the —  23  — 
representative producer,  and,  hence,  the survival probability of 
the political establishment,  depend on the amount of public 
services that  the  fiscal  authority provides as well  as on the tax 
rate. 
The  first—order conditions for  a maximum value  of ER are  that 
the derivatives  of ER with respect to x and  with  respect to g 
equal  zero.  Thus,  x'  and  g'  satisfy 
(24)  + !a  r  =  X 1  X (l_p)2 
where  = y (1  - ---- -i--—  and  = - 
and 
(25)  +  3p  r  =  g 1—p  g  (1—p)2  r  Sxy  where  = 
(l—a)g 
— 1  and  eqSz/g. 
Equation (24) like  equation (11) above,  says  that  the optimal 
proprietary policy equates the expected marginal revenue from 
taxation to the marginal cost  of the  tax  rate  in reducing  the 
probability  of surviving  to collect future  political rents,  except 
that  the marginal revenue from taxation and  the marginal cost of 
taxation now depend on the amount  of public services as well  as on 
the  tax  rate  itself.  Equation (25)  says  that  the optimal 
proprietary policy also  equates the expected marginal cost of 
public services in reducing current poltical rents  to the marginal 
benefit of public services in increasing the survival 
probability. 
Equations (24) and  (25)  together imply  that  g'  and  x  also 
satisfy equations (20)  and (22).  This result says  that,  given the 
tax  rate,  the  functiona].\  kieptocrat,  like  the hypothetically —  24  — 
benevolent  fiscal authority, would  spend  a sufficient amount on 
productive public services to maximize the  net contribution of 
public services to marketable output.  For  a given tax  rate,  this 
spending policy maximizes both the  tax  base  and expected political 
rents. 
The functional kleptocrat,  however,  does  not  choose  the  same 
tax  rate  as would  a benevolent fiscal  authority.  For example, if 
q  equals  zero,  then  equation (24), like  equation (11) above, 
implies that  x'  equals  1—ct.  In other words,  if the time— 
consistency constraint is not  binding,  then  the functional 
kleptocrat,  like  a pure kleptocrat,  in the absence ot political 
competition would set  the  tax  rate  to maximize tax  revenue. 
The assumption of diminishing returns to scale  means that 
1—ct  is larger  than  3.  Thus,  if q equals  zero,  then x  is 
larger than  x  and,  consequently, equation (22)  implies ttiat g' 
is smaller than  g 
.  In other words,  if  the  time—consistency 
constraint is not binding, the proprietary fiscal  authority in the 
absence of political competition would set  a higher tax rate and 
would provide a smaller amount of public services than  would a 
benevolent fiscal  authority.  Accordingly, the proprietary policy 
would result  in  a smaller production of marketable output and  a 
lower  level  of utility for the  representative  producer than would 
a benevolent policy. 
These differences,  however,  would  be smaller the larger are 
a and  .  Specifically,  as the  sum  of  a and  approaches unity 
——  that  is,  as the technology approaches constant returns  to scale 
—— g'  approaches  , x'  approaches  ,  and  the maximum amount at 
rent  that  the political establishment can collect approaches zero. 
Analysis of equation (24)  and  (25) also reveals  that,  it the 
time—consistency constraint is not binding, the effects at 
political competition .q  and political stability  8  on the 
functional kieptocrat  are a straightforward extension  of the —  25  — 
effects  on a pure  kleptocrat.  Specifically, if q  is positive, 
then x'  is smaller,  g' is larger,  and  the amount of political rent 
is smaller than  with  q equal  to zero.  Political competition 
causes the proprietary fiscal authority both to set  a lower tax 
rate  and  to provide a larger amount of public services in order to 
enhance the survival probability  of  the political establisnment. 
Moreover, as with the pure kleptocrat,  if q is positive, then x' 
is lower  and  g' is larger the larger are  q and  0.  Thus,  the 
optimal policy of the functional kleptocrat is closer to the 
optimal policy of the hypothetically benevolent fiscal authority 
the  more  competitive  and  the more stable is the political 
system. 
Now consider the policy of the functional kieptocrat in the 
case  in which the time—consistency constraint is binding.  In 
place of condition (14), this  constraint for  the functional 
kieptocrat is that,  if the equilibrium tax  rate  x*  is less than 
unity,  then  x  and  the equilibrium amount  of public services, 
denoted by  g* satisfy the condition 
(26)  (xy — g)  >  y  — g 
The  the  of condition (26) gives the present value  at date t+l  ot 
current and expected future political rents  it  at all  dates 
t  the fiscal authority provides public services in amount 
g  and announces tax rate x for date r+l  and then honors this 
announcement at date t+1.  The  rhs  of condition (26) gives  the 
present value  at date  t÷1  of political rents  if the fiscal 
authority has provided public services in amount  g  and  has 
announced tax  rate  x  at date  t  and were to set  the  tax  rate 
equal to unity at date t+1. 
To determine  how condition (26) restricts  x  and  g* 
define  x  and  g  to e  the  tax  rate  and  amount  of public 
services that  maximize ER,  as given by equations (23),  subject —  26  — 
to  the constraint given by equation (26)  being  satisfied as an 
equality.  Thus,  x  and  7  satisfy the first—order conditions 
(27)  _E_ +  r  +  —L-  + p  r  —  0  and 
cX  i—  3X  X 1P  3X 
(1—p)2  X 
(28)  +  3p  r  + A  [p—  _L_ +  3p  r  —  +  1]  =  g 1—p  g  (1—p)2  g  i—p  g (1—p)2  g 
where  = - —s--  1_,  = __ 
1—a  l—x  g  1—a  g 
3r  p 3r  p 
- 
r—  --—  ----  are  as in equations (24)  an (2b) above, 
and where  A  is a positive Lagrange  multiplier. 
These first—order conditions imply  that  the ettects of the 
time—consistency  constraint on the functional kieptocrat  are also 
a straightforward extension  of  the effects on a pure  kleptocrat. 
Specifically, equations (27) and  (28) together imply  that 
g and  x  also satisfy equations (20) and  (22).  Even  if  the  time 
consistency constraint is binding,  the functional  kleptocrat 
provides productive public services in the quantity that,  given 
the tax  rate,  maximizes the  net contribution  of public  services to 
marketable output. 
Given that  in equilibrium  p  equals  8,  after  imposing  the 
equilibrium condition that  equals  x and  g  equals  g* 
condition (26)  together with  equation (20)  imply  that 
(29)  x =  (1—B)(l—8)  + 8. 
Moreover, the  time—consistent  reputatiorial equilibrium for  the 
functional kleptocrat in general satisfies 
(30)  x  max (x', x) and 
(31)  g*  mm  (g', g), —  27  — 
where  g' and  x1  and  g and  x  are related according to equation 
(22).  Equation (30)  has  the  same  form as equation (16) that 
applied to the  pure  kieptocrat,  although  x'  and  x  for  a 
functional kleptocrat are generally not equal to  x'  and  1—0 
for  a pure kieptocrat.  Nevertheless,  Figure 1  with  x  replacing 
1—8  also  summarizes the qualitative properties of the 
reputational equilibrium for  the functional kleptocrat.  The 
x'  =  x  boundary intersects the q = 0  boundary at  6 = 
6.  Summary 
The analysis, as summarized by Figure  1,  shows  that,  if the 
political system is sufficiently  stable,  a more  competitive 
political system is better up to a point.  As  long  as the time— 
consistency constraint is not  binding,  more political competition, 
like  more  political  stability, implies  a lower tax  rate  and  more 
spending on productive  public services.  In this  case,  he 
proprietary fiscal  authority, in order  to enhance the survival 
probability  of the political establishment,  behaves more  like  a 
hypothetically  benevolent fiscal  authority. 
Political competition,  however,  can  lower  the  equilibrium  tax 
rate and increase the equilibrium spending on productive public 
services only  until  the time—consistency constraint becomes 
binding.  Consequently, the beneficial  effect of political 
competition increases  with the stability of the political 
system.  Regardless of the  amount  of political competition, a 
political system that  is insufficiently  stable can cause the 
fiscal  authority  to be trapped on the wrong side  of the Latfer 
curve  and  to provide little in the  way  of productive public 
services. 
Why then,  as we  asked  in the introduction, have  tax and 
spending policies in some of the modern democracies apparently 
been,  if not welfare maximizing, at least  more  benevolent than  in —  28  — 
the  typical kieptocracy?  The  theory  of proprietary public finance 
developed  here suggests that  the  fiscal  authorities in these 
modern democracies are  riot  necessarily relatively uninterested in 
maximizing political rents  or relatively  wise or knowledgable. 
Instead,  the  theory  suggests not  that  they  do not share the 
objectives of other kieptocrats,  but rather that  they  face 
economic and political constraints  that  induce  them  to follow 
policies that  are closer to the policies of a hypothetically 
benevolent fiscal  authority.  The theory suggests, specifically, 
that  the essential characteristic  of  these modern democracies is 
that  their political systems combine a high degree of political 
stability  with a positive amount of effective political 
competition. —  29  — 
FOOTNOTES 
1.  The analysis abstracts  from  the process of forming the 
political  establishment  and  from  the  related  agency problem 
that  North stresses  in his discussion  of the extraction of 
political rents.  We implicitly  assume  that  the process by 
which the political  establishment  appoints and  removes 
individual  policymakers  insures  that  the  fiscal  authority 
faithfully  translates  the political establishment's 
preferences into policy. 
2.  This analysis  would  extend  in a more  general framework  to 
the more basic policy  choice  emphasized by North between a 
structure  of property  rights  that  facilitates  the extraction 
of political rents and a structure  that  enhances  the welfare 
of the  representative  citizen.  The specific  models 
developed  below  implicitly  take  as given  the structure  of 
property rights  and exchange  and other determinants  of the 
economy's  production  possibilities,  except  for provision  of 
productive  public services.  Moreover, the  analysis  does  not 
consider the possible use  of police powers  to increase the 
survival probability  of the existing political  establishment 
by suppressing  dissent.  The analysis also takes  the fiscal 
jurisdiction  as given——see  Friedman (1977) tor  a  relevant 
analysis——and  abstracts  from  the  threat  of secession,  a 
possibility analyzed by Buchanan  & Faith (1987). 
3.  In an extended model,  this  inverse  relation between  and 
x+l  also  could  involve the relocation  of taxable activity 
outside the jurisdiction  of this  fiscal  authority,  a 
possibility analyzed in the literature  stemming trom the 
work  of Tiebout (1956) and  also  emphasized  by Friedman 
(1977)  and by North. —  30  — 
4.  In this  setup,  does  not  depend  on  the actual 
tax  rate  imposed  at date  t+l.  In other words,  the 
political  establishments  survival  to date  t+l  is 
determined  before  x1 
is imposed.  An alternative 
formulation,  which  would complicate  the analysis of the 
reputational  equilibrium,  would  have  t+l  depend on 
x1,  rather than  on  with survival  in power to 
date  t+l——that is,  the  ability  to collect  political rents 
at date  t+l——determined  after  the  fiscal  authority  attempts 
to impose  xt+i. 
5.  If,  as suggested  in the preceding  footnote,  depended 
on  x1 rather than on  the fiscal  authority  would 
be tempted  to set  x÷j  to maximize  rather 
than  to maximize  The  implied  tax  rate,  although 
higher than  x,  would be less  than unity  if  q  is 
positive.  Moreover,  although the present  model focuses  on a 
simple proportionate income  tax, a similar  time—consistency 
constraint  would apply  to any tax  that  the  fiscal  authority 
would  be  tempted  to impose  at a higher  rate  than  expected. 
See Grossman  & Van  Huyck  (1986) for an analysis at a time— 
consistent reputational  equilibrium  for  seigniorage,  in 
which case  inflation is the  tax. —  31  — 
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